To gain an initial understanding of the magnitude of Iran’s threat to Middle Eastern countries (cf. regional saturation), one may look at current air‑traffic disruptions: major airports in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain have had to cancel between 70% and 95% of departing flights.

Looking further, for the first time in modern history, Iran has effectively forced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to maritime navigation without imposing a naval blockade. Instead, it has struck and threatened to strike oil tankers, LNG carriers, and other commercial vessels attempting to transit through the Strait (cf. asymmetric offensive).

This strategic closure has laid the foundations for a genuine international energy crisis, which has already affected not only the United States and Israel, but also Italy, China, and India.

The ISPI (Italian Institute for International Political Studies) has provided an excellent analysis of the possible medium‑ and long‑term consequences of this new “energy crisis.”

(See the article at: https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/dalliran-al-mondo-6-grafici-sullimpatto-economico-della-guerra-231852).

In particular, it has been noted that, in the short term, Asian countries appear to be the most exposed to interruptions in crude oil supplies from the Middle East.

Should the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz persist, China and India would be the first to suffer, as approximately 50% of their oil originates from Gulf countries.

Similarly, South Korea and Japan would face severe consequences, as they are among the principal destinations of Middle Eastern oil transiting through the Strait.

In the Western sphere, risks for the United States and European countries appear more contained, though not negligible. Around 4% of oil transiting through Hormuz is destined for Europe; for the United States, the figure is even lower, a little above 2%.

This assessment must be partially corrected when referring to the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar.

In this specific market, the crisis is already producing severe repercussions in Europe, where wholesale natural gas prices briefly rose above €60/MWh. Italy, once again, ranks among the most disadvantaged EU countries, as gas accounts for 38% of its total energy consumption.

If the crisis persists, Europe’s only alternative may again be importing LNG from Russia, with the serious risk of undermining recent EU regulations aimed at eliminating Russian gas imports by 2027.

In short, although the conditions for a cascading shock are clearly present, the countries involved are not exposed in the same way.

The overall impact of the described “energy crisis” and the sustained rise in oil and LNG prices will, in fact, be asymmetric:

countries like the United States, thanks to their status as net energy exporters, will experience mitigated inflationary pressures, while economies heavily dependent on Gulf oil – such as China, India, and the EU – will face uncertain but potentially significant consequences for their growth and macroeconomic stability.